On July 9, Mikhail Bogdanov, long seen as the architect of Russia’s policy in the region, was relieved of his duties as deputy foreign minister and special presidential envoy for the Middle East and Africa.
Bogdanov as scapegoat
Officially, the 72-year-old was dismissed for "personal reasons" and "advanced age," though Bogdanov is the same age as Putin himself, and younger than Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The timing of the move—amid regional upheaval—suggests deeper political motives.
Bogdanov spent more than five decades in Soviet and Russian diplomacy, serving in Yemen, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Syria. He was appointed deputy foreign minister in 2011, just as the Arab Spring sparked unrest across the Middle East—including in Syria, where civil war broke out later that year.
In 2015, Russia intervened militarily on behalf of embattled Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, a move in which Bogdanov played a key role. Prior to the deployment of Russian forces, he helped shape Moscow’s policy of backing Assad against both opposition groups and Islamist factions, effectively supporting the murder of thousands of Syrians.
Courting all sides
The Middle East remains strategically vital for Russia, which has employed a duplicitous approach of courting all sides—Sunni and Shia, Israeli and Iranian—not to mediate, but to position itself as everyone’s indispensable partner and the West’s antagonist.
Moscow criticised the US-led removal of Saddam Hussein while courting Iraq’s Shia leadership, simultaneously reminding Sunni allies of its historic support for Saddam.
Russia maintained warm ties with Iran but also gave tacit approval for Israeli airstrikes against Iranian positions in Syria—strikes that were possible only because Russian air defences in the region were never activated.
Bogdanov was tasked with managing this high-wire act. But as the war in Ukraine weakened Russia’s global standing, cracks in its Middle East strategy began to show.
Sudden fall of Assad’s regime
The biggest blow came in December last year, with the sudden fall of Assad’s regime—a failure Bogdanov neither predicted nor prevented.
In fact, his policies may have contributed to the collapse.
Moscow’s arrangements with Israel—trading Syria for Israeli neutrality on Ukraine—reportedly included looking the other way when Israel bombed Iranian targets.
Russian-aligned Syrian officials sabotaged Iranian efforts to resist a jihadist offensive in Aleppo. Moscow assumed Assad was too reliant on Russian support to fall. That assumption proved to be false.
Assad’s downfall left Russia scrambling: Should it rescue its longtime client or pivot to Syria’s new rulers?
Ultimately, Moscow arranged a "humanitarian evacuation" and offered Assad asylum.
But the damage to Russia’s reputation as a reliable ally was done—especially after it failed to respond to Israeli attacks on Iran, despite a 2025 strategic cooperation treaty.
Russia’s ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, admitted in a televised interview that the most Shia allies could expect was "the prayers of millions of Russians."
Pivoting to Syria's new rulers
Bogdanov's final mission was to persuade Syria’s new leadership—jihadist factions led by Ahmed al-Shara—that Russia had never truly backed Assad, that it supported the Syrian state regardless of who was in charge, and that, as such, the new rulers should overlook the fact that Moscow had once bombed them, recognise Russia as a partner, and allow it to keep its military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim.
Bogdanov assured Putin he could deliver, and in January, he travelled to negotiate directly with Shara.
But the Syrians demanded Assad's extradition. Still, as late as May, Bogdanov continued to tell Putin that talks were progressing.
They weren’t. The Syrians scrapped their agreement with Russia to manage the Tartus port and handed control to the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, they began moving toward a deal with the United States.
Putin’s patience ran out. Bogdanov was dismissed—fortunate, by Russian standards, to have escaped with his life and not become the victim of a suspicious "suicide."
The Kremlin now appears to be betting that Bogdanov’s ouster will serve two purposes: placating Iran, by scapegoating the man widely blamed for Assad's downfall, and signaling to Syria’s new rulers that Moscow is prepared to break with past loyalties. Whether that gamble pays off remains to be seen.
Witold Repetowicz
Witold Repetowicz. Photo: PR24/AK
The author is an assistant professor at the War Studies University in Warsaw.